Sonia: So, you are not expecting a rate hike from the US Fed this year?

 Marc Faber : What I said is in my view the Fed will not increase rates this year unless there is really a very sharp pick up in the economy or there is a colossal pot-hole developing in stocks. But otherwise I doubt it because the dollar has been strong. Okay, it may weaken somewhat, but I do not think it will collapse against the euro and against the yen and the British pound and so forth. So, the dollar is relatively strong. The economy in the US, the latest say, ten indicators that came out were all on the weak side. And under these conditions I doubt the Fed will increase rates. But that is an academic debate. What is important is I think the Feds and other Western Central Bankers will keep interest rates at a very low level for a very long time and will try to keep interest rates in real terms negative. In other words below the rates of cost of living increases. – in CNBC TV 18

Also from Marc:

India to become the biggest Economy soon

Marc Faber says emerging markets have become relatively inexpensive versus developed markets. Investors are now realizing how inexpensive these EMs are and hence more money is flowing in, he adds.

Marc Faber : Concerning growth, first of all in India and elsewhere among people who invest in India, the view was that India could be the fastest growing economy in the world in the next 5-10 years. I do not think so. That is overly optimistic and overly optimistic expectations. If India, let us take worst and best case. Worst case India grows at 3-4 percent per annum. Best case it grows at 8 percent. Both are not very likely. So let us assume it grows at 4-5 percent per annum. That is still a fantastic growth rate compared to other countries, compared to the whole of Western Europe, compared to the United States. People have misconception about growth; they think that an economy can grow at 8-9 percent forever, that is not the case, it is not possible. So, I am happy if India grows say at, 4-5 percent per annum.

Read more HERE

US T-Bond futures closed Friday, March 27 up nearly 12% from the February close.  That was the 3rd largest monthly percent move since 1977 when my data begins and created a 3.61 standard deviation change.  This is a huge move.  What does it mean?

The US T-Bond market peaked on March 25 at an all-time high over 165, up from about 75 in 1990.  Bonds move inversely with yields, so yields have dropped to their lowest level ever.  This is not surprising because central banks have been monetizing sovereign debt, buying bonds, and supporting the bond and stock markets.  Several $Trillion in European sovereign debt currently “pays” negative interest – an extreme condition.  The Bank of Japan has aggressively purchased Japanese government bonds as well as Japanese stocks – another extreme example of a bond bubble.

Bonds are priced less on their return and risk of default and more on the current and expected purchases of central banks, which seems crazy.  However, central banks are “managing” most markets and have both the means and need to do so.  Expect more “management” in coming months.

Examine the log scale chart of the monthly US T-Bonds since 1990.

….continue reading HERE

We live in a time of unprecedented financial repression. As I have continued writing about this, I have become increasingly angry about the fact that central banks almost everywhere have decided to address the economic woes of the world by driving down the returns on the savings of those who can least afford it – retirees and pensioners.

This week’s Outside the Box, from my good friend Chris Whalen of Kroll Bond Rating Agency, goes farther and outlines how a low-interest-rate and massive QE environment is also destructive of other parts of the economy. Counterintuitively, the policies pursued by central banks are actually driving the deflationary environment rather than fighting it.

This is a short but very powerful Outside the Box. And to further Chris’s point I want to share with you a graph that he sent me, from a later essay he wrote. It shows that the cost of funds for US banks has dropped over $100 billion since the financial crisis, but their net interest income is almost exactly the same. What changed? Banks are now paying you and me and businesses $100 billion less. The Fed’s interest-rate policy has meant a great deal less income for US savers.

Central Banks, Credit Expansion, and the Importance of Being Impatient

This research note is based on the presentation given by Christopher Whalen, Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA) Senior Managing Director and Head of Research, at the Banque de France on Monday, March 23, 2015, for an event organized by the Global Interdependence Center (GIC) entitled “New Policies for the Post Crisis Era.” KBRA is pleased to be a sponsor of the GIC.

Summary

Investors are keenly focused on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to see whether the U.S. central bank is prepared to raise interest rates later this year – or next. The attention of the markets has been focused on a single word, “patience,” which has been a key indicator of whether the Fed is going to shift policy after nearly 15 years of maintaining extraordinarily low interest rates. This week, the Fed dropped the word “patience” from its written policy guidance, but KBRA does not believe that the rhetorical change will be meaningful to fixed income investors. We do not expect that the Fed will attempt to raise interest rates for the balance of 2015.

This long anticipated shift in policy guidance by the Fed comes even as interest rates in the EU are negative and the European Central Bank has begun to buy securities in open market operations mimicking those conducted by the FOMC over the past several years. Investors and markets need to appreciate that, regardless of what the FOMC decides this month or next, the global economy continues to suffer from the effects of the financial excesses of the 2000s.

The decision by the ECB to finally begin U.S. style “quantitative easing” (QE) almost eight years after the start of the subprime financial crisis in 2007 speaks directly to the failure of policy to address both the causes and the terrible effects of the financial crisis. Consider several points:

• QE by the ECB must be seen in the context of a decade long period of abnormally low interest rates. U.S. interest rate policy has been essentially unchanged since 2001, when interest rates were cut following the 9/11 attack. The addition of QE 1-3 was an effort at further monetary stimulus beyond zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) meant to boost asset prices and thereby change investor tolerance for risk.
   
• QE makes sense only from a Keynesian/socialist perspective, however, and ignores the long-term cost of low interest rate policies to individual investors and financial institutions. Indeed, in the present interest rate environment, to paraphrase John Dizard of the Financial Times, it has become mathematically impossible for fiduciaries to meet the beneficiaries’ future investment return target needs through the prudent buying of securities. (See John Dizard, “Embrace the contradictions of QE and sell all the good stuff,” Financial Times, March 14, 2015.)
   
• The downside of QE in the U.S. and EU is that it does not address the core problems of hidden off- balance sheet debt that caused the massive “run on liquidity” in 2008. That is, banks and markets in the U.S. globally face tens of trillions of dollars in “off-balance sheet” debt that has not been resolved. The bad debt which is visible on the books of U.S. and EU banks is also a burden in the sense that bank managers know that it must eventually be resolved. Whether we talk of loans by German banks to Greece or home equity loans in the U.S. for homes that are underwater on the first mortgage, bad debt is a drag on economic growth.
   
• Despite the fact that many of these debts are uncollectible, governments in the U.S. and EU refuse to restructure because doing so implies capital losses for banks and further expenses for cash- strapped governments. In effect, the Fed and ECB have decided to address the issue of debt by slowly confiscating value from investors via negative rates, this because the fiscal authorities in the respective industrial nations cannot or will not address the problem directly.
   
• ZIRP and QE as practiced by the Fed and ECB are not boosting, but instead depressing, private sector economic activity. By using bank reserves to acquire government and agency securities, the FOMC has actually been retarding private economic growth, even while pushing up the prices of financial assets around the world.
   
• ZIRP has reduced the cost of funds for the $15 trillion asset U.S. banking system from roughly half a trillion dollars annually to less than $50 billion in 2014. This decrease in the interest expense for banks comes directly out of the pockets of savers and financial institutions. While the Fed pays banks 25bp for their reserve deposits, the remaining spread earned on the Fed’s massive securities portfolio is transferred to the U.S. Treasury – a policy that does nothing to support credit creation or growth. The income taken from bond investors due to ZIRP and QE is far larger.
   
• No matter how low interest rates go and how much debt central banks buy, the fact of financial repression where savers are penalized to advantage debtors has an overall deflationary impact on the global economy. Without a commensurate increase in national income, the elevated asset prices resulting from ZIRP and QE cannot be validated and sustained. Thus with the end of QE in the U.S. and the possibility of higher interest rates, global investors face the decline of valuations for both debt and equity securities.
   
• In opposition to the intended goal of low interest rate and QE policies, we also have a regressive framework of regulations and higher bank capital requirements via Basel III and other policies that are actually limiting the leverage of the global financial system. The fact that banks cannot or will not lend to many parts of society because of harsh new financial regulations only exacerbates the impact of financial repression. Thus we take income from savers to advantage debtors, while limiting credit to society as a whole. Only large private corporations and government sponsored enterprises with access to equally large banks and global capital markets are able to function and grow in this environment.

So what is to be done? KBRA believes that the FOMC and policy makers in the U.S. and EU need to refocus their efforts on first addressing the issue of excessive debt and secondly rebalancing fiscal policies so as to boost private sector economic activity. Low or even negative interest rate policies which punish savers in order to pretend that bad debts are actually good are only making things worse and accelerate global deflation. Around the globe, nations from China to Brazil and Greece are all feeling the adverse effects of excessive debt and the related decline in commodity prices and overall economic activity. This decline, in turn, is being felt via lower prices for both commodities and traded goods – that is, deflation.

In the U.S., sectors such as housing and energy, the effects of weak consumer activity and oversupply are combining into a perfect storm of deflation. For example, The Atlanta Fed forecast for real GDP has been falling steadily as the underlying Blue Chip economic forecasts have also declined. The drop in capital expenditures related to oil and gas have resulted in a sharp decline in related economic activity and employment. Falling prices for oil and other key industrial commodities, weak private sector credit creation, falling transaction volumes in the U.S. housing sector, and other macroeconomic indicators all suggest that economic growth remains quite fragile.

To deal with this dangerous situation, the FOMC should move to gradually increase interest rates to restore cash flow to the financial system, following the famous dictum of Adam Smith that the “Great Wheel” of circulation is the means by which the flow of goods and services moves through the economy:

“The great wheel of circulation is altogether different from the goods which are circulated by means of it. The revenue of the society consists altogether in those goods, and not in the wheel which circulates them” (Smith 1811: 202).

Increased regulation and a decrease in the effective leverage in many sectors of banking and commerce have contributed to a slowing of credit creation and economic activity overall. And most importantly, the issue of unresolved debt, on and off balance sheet, remains a dead weight retarding economic growth. For this reason, KBRA believes that investors ought to become impatient with policy makers and encourage new approaches to boosting economic growth.

Related Publications:

• U.S. Real Estate Prices Show Signs of Rising Again (Published February 23, 2015)
   
• GSE Litigation Affirms that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are Sovereign Credits(Published February 19, 2015)
   
• Swiss Francs & Global Debt Deflation (Published January 21, 2015)

Yet another central bank has announced a warning about the perils of deflation. Please consider China Central Bank Calls for Vigilance on Deflation.

China’s central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan warned on Sunday that the country needs to be vigilant for signs of deflation and said policymakers were closely watching slowing global economic growth and declining commodity prices.

Zhou’s comments are likely to add to concerns that China is in danger of slipping into deflation and underline increasing nervousness among policymakers as the economy continues to lose momentum despite a raft of stimulus measures.

“Inflation in China is also declining. We need to have vigilance if this can go further to reach some sort of deflation or not,” Zhou said at a high-level forum in Boao, on the southern Chinese island of Hainan.

Zhou added that the speed with which inflation was slowing was a “little too quick”, though this was part of China’s ongoing market readjustment and reforms.

Historical Perspective On CPI Deflations

In its March report, the BIS took a look at the Costs of Deflations: A Historical Perspective. Here are the key findings.

Concerns about deflation – falling prices of goods and services – are rooted in the view that it is very costly. We test the historical link bet ween output growth and deflation in a sample covering 140 years for up to 38 economies. The evidence suggests that this link is weak and derives largely from the Great Depression. But we find a stronger link between output growth and asset price deflations, particularly during postwar property price deflations. We fail to uncover evidence that high debt has so far raised the cost of goods and services price deflations, in so-called debt deflations. The most damaging interaction appears to be between property price deflations and private debt.

Deflation may actually boost output. Lower prices increase real incomes and wealth. And they may also make export goods more competitive.

Once we control for persistent asset price deflations and country-specific average changes in growth rates over the sample periods, persistent goods and services (CPI ) deflations do not appear to be linked in a statistically significant way with slower growth even in the interwar period. They are uniformly statistically insignificant except for the first post-peak year during the postwar era – where, however, deflation appears to usher in stronger output growth. By contrast, the link of both property and equity price deflations with output growth is always the expected one, and is consistently statistically significant.

Conclusions

The evidence from our long historical data set sheds new light on the costs of deflations. It raises questions about the prevailing view that goods and services price deflations, even if persistent, are always pernicious. It suggests that asset price deflations, and particularly house price deflations in the postwar era, have been more damaging. And it cautions against presuming that the interaction between debt and goods and services price deflation , as opposed to debt’s interaction with property price deflations, has played a significant role in past episodes of economic weakness.

The exception to the general rule was the Great Depression but, that was also an asset bubble deflation coupled with consumer price deflation.

Meanwhile central banks on every continent are worried about something they should welcome.

Economic Challenge to Keynesians

Of all the widely believed but patently false economic beliefs is the absurd notion that falling consumer prices are bad for the economy and something must be done about them.

I have commented on this many times and have been vindicated not only by sound economic theory but also by actual historical examples.

My January 20, post Deflation Bonanza! (And the Fool’s Mission to Stop It) has a good synopsis.

And my Challenge to Keynesians “Prove Rising Prices Provide an Overall Economic Benefit” has gone unanswered.

There is no answer because history and logic both show that concerns over consumer price deflation are seriously misplaced.

Worse yet, in their attempts to fight routine consumer price deflation, central bankers create very destructive asset bubbles that eventually collapse, setting off what they should fear – asset bubble deflations following a buildup a bank credit on inflated assets.

Though the Fed would deny it, it is clear from the minutes of the last Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting that a rise in interest rates has been put off indefinitely. The subsequent rally in the price of gold and the sudden fall in the dollar tend to confirm this conclusion.

The Fed Funds Rate, which is the interest rate the Fed targets to set all other rates, has now been less than 0.25% for six and a quarter years, gradually declining from roughly 0.15% to about 0.10% today. It was set at a target range of between zero and 0.25% in December 2008.

According to the Policy Normalisation Principles and Plans issued last September, the FOMC will raise its target range for

the Fed Funds Rate “primarily by adjusting the interest rate it pays on excess reserve balances” when the Fed normalises interest rates, “using reverse repurchase agreements to take money out of circulation to the degree necessary”. The Fed also intends to reduce its holdings of securities and contract its balance sheet in the longer run.

If normalisation is the result of economic recovery we will be familiar with the playbook. Demand for money in the economy picks up, and instead of pyramiding bank credit on reserves held at the Fed, the Fed feeds back the excess reserves to the banks by selling government securities into the markets. The bear market in government bonds should be manageable because of underlying pension and insurance company demand coupled with a diminishing budget deficit. This is the long-understood theory behind withdrawing from deficit financing.

The reality has been very different as we all know. The Fed has to face the possibility that, for whatever reason, highly suppressed interest rates are not working, and an escape from the zero interest rate bound without economic recovery may have to be contemplated.

However, if the Fed raises the Fed Funds Rate in the absence of genuine economic recovery, there will be little or no expansion of bank credit to offset, and commercial banks will want to dump their Treasuries, not buy more from the Fed. There would be no offsets to cushion the unwinding of long bond positions. In other words the effect of even a small rise in the Fed Funds Rate could develop into a self-feeding rise in bond yields and substantial losses for the banks.

This is the context within which we should consider the Fed’s decision to back off from raising the Fed Funds Rate mid-year. It leads to the conclusion that if zero interest rates haven’t worked for six and a quarter years, monetary policy itself is in a cul-de-sac with no space to turn. And when we look at Japan and the Eurozone we see similar disappointments over the effectiveness of monetary policy.

Markets are unlikely to wait until the escape from the zero bound is put to the test. Before the investing public becomes aware of the full ramifications of the problem, more prescient bankers and fund managers will reposition their bond holdings, which brings us to gold.

Those of us that follow this market closely know that for the last three years at least Asian demand has led to large shifts of bullion from western capital markets towards Asia. The behaviour of the markets in London and New York already indicate that shortages of physical bullion are a delicate problem, and this is before markets wake up to the growing likelihood that the Fed cannot afford to see interest rates rise.

If interest rates cannot rise, then the dollar itself is ultimately exposed to loss of confidence in the foreign exchanges. The dawning realisation that after recent strength, the dollar is vulnerable after all can be expected to be reflected in a positive sentiment towards gold, which once under way could drive the price up dramatically due to the lack of available bullion.

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